Regression-proof a rule change
Replay the full credential-to-decoy-to-discovery story and confirm that every intended rule still appears with the same traceable evidence.
Full pipeline storyControlled defensive security laboratory
MIRAGE is a local-first SOC lab for deterministic telemetry replay, ATT&CK-aware detections, analyst disposition practice, and repeatable evaluation. It is built to explain what a rule needs, what it found, and where its conclusion must stop.
Practical use cases
Each exercise has a declared expected result. Positive scenarios show a defined rule path; benign and boundary scenarios show what should not become an alert.
Replay the full credential-to-decoy-to-discovery story and confirm that every intended rule still appears with the same traceable evidence.
Full pipeline storyCompare a success after repeated failures with the source, window, and documented benign boundary before assigning a disposition.
Credential probeRun ordinary administrative activity and verify it produces no case, rather than treating an absence of alerts as an assumption.
Benign admin activityRun one fewer failure than the configured threshold to demonstrate that the rule’s trigger is intentional and observable.
Threshold boundaryCompare a longer source-bound failure sequence with scheduled service retries and a one-event-below boundary before escalating the controlled signal.
Low-and-slow pressureRequire a matching login, a short time window, and an explicitly unapproved synthetic marker before raising the controlled case.
Policy-change contextDetection contract
| Rule | What it demonstrates | Required evidence | Analyst boundary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Repeated SSH authentication failures | T1110 — Brute Force | Failure event type, source, time, and account candidate | A threshold match is suspicious in the lab, not a production verdict. |
| Successful login after repeated failures | T1078 — Valid Accounts | Source-bound failure sequence and later success inside the window | Legitimate users can make mistakes; evaluate the surrounding context. |
| Multi-stage decoy engagement and discovery | T1087 — Account Discovery | Credential activity, decoy interaction, and allowlisted discovery evidence | One inventory command alone does not form the complete lab story. |
| Low-and-slow authentication pressure | T1110 — Brute Force | Source-bound failures, count, minimum time span, and maximum correlation window | Scheduled retries and just-below-threshold sequences remain documented controls. |
| Unapproved synthetic access-policy change after login | T1098 — Account Manipulation | Source-bound login, synthetic change event, time window, and explicit approval-state marker | This is a lab-only context exercise; it does not inspect or alter real access policies. |
Catalog traceability
Catalog v1.2.0 separates the defensive strategy from the analytic implementation. Every rule records an analytic version, change class, positive scenario, and negative or edge control before it is presented as validated evidence.
Start here
Repository evidence